The American
science of politics found its naturalist, positivist face in the behavioral revolution of the 1950s. Only then did many members
of the discipline accept and become comfortable with the scientific identity of the discipline. Behavioralism established
an agreed upon methodology (modeled after the natural sciences) which was (ostensibly) value free and emphasized quantification
toward the end of generating covering laws to aid in predicting political behavior. Though this has changed in some respects
since the behavioral revolution, the positivist model of science still informs the scientific identity of the discipline.
The cost of the scientific identity to the discipline has been the marginalization of normative political theory. In fact,
behavioralism called for an end to normative political theory since it did not aid the empirical science of politics. And
normative political theory has never recovered. Normative political theorizing has certainly not been abandoned and it surely
has a home in "postbehavioral" political science. But, we cannot deny that the research accorded the most legitimacy within
the discipline and its various departments is that research that makes some claim to being "scientific."
Tim Duvall
Department
of Political Science
Social Sciences
315
The University
of Arizona
Tucson,
AZ 85721
The Effects
of Method and Market on Research Relevance
Presented
at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1998.
The
behavioral movement in the discipline took its methodological cues from Logical positivism, which was spawned by the Vienna
Circle during the 1920s and 1930s. The Vienna Circle, under the intellectual leadership of Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap,
sought to elevate scientific method and mathematical logic to preeminent status as generators of knowledge. Indeed, logical
positivism "stigmatized metaphysical, theological, and ethical pronouncements as devoid of cognitive meaning and advocated
a radical reconstruction of philosophical thinking which should give pride of place to the methods of physical science and
mathematical logic" (Achinstein and Barker 1969: v). Logical positivism claimed to be the "philosophy to end all philosophies."
Logical
positivists simply emphasized empirical tests. The dictates of scientific method indicate that a theory only has meaning when
it can be verified by observation. Thus, theology, ethics and metaphysical expressions in general are cognitively meaningless
since they cannot be empirically verified and therefore cannot be part of any scientific inquiry.
This is
precisely the notion of knowledge that behavioralists in the discipline of political science adopted during the 1940s and
1950s. This should come as no surprise, though, since we know that the scientific identity of the discipline had historically
followed developments in natural science and that logical positivism was an important philosophical perspective throughout
the world by the 1930s (Blalock 1982: 12; Achinstein and Barker 1969: v). The positivist version of knowledge clearly informs
the tenets of the "Behavioral Credo" and it is quite clear that behavioralists were focused upon pure knowledge and the expulsion
of metaphysical "guesswork" from the practice of political science. This focus came under some scrutiny, though, during the
"Postbehavioral Movement" of the 1960s and 1970s.
Gunnell,
John G. [1993. The Descent of Political Theory: The Genealogy of an American Vocation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press]The
Discipline’s Community:
Gunnell
argues, for example, that the behavioral revolution took place specifically in response to the immigration of German political
scholars. He claims that the "insinuation of the ideas of the European Right and Left" into the discipline ultimately "gave
form and meaning to behavioralism". In particular, Gunnell contends that the construction of a "more self-conscious scientific
identity" in the form of behavioralism was "fundamentally a function of the belief that there was a need to defend the traditional
vision of social science against the emerging antiscientific philosophies" at the hands of German émigré scholars (emphasis
mine).
My argument
differs from Gunnell’s in this respect. I have argued elsewhere that the discipline of political science had been casting
about for a coherent scientific identity at least forty years prior to the behavioral revolution (Duvall 1997). Thus, while
German émigré scholars may have played a role in the codification of behavioralism, the seeds for the behavioral revolution
were planted long before its inception. This interpretation is significant since it deepens the form and meaning of behavioralism.
The behavioral revolution, on my account, was not merely a response to the influx of German scholars following World War II.
Rather, behavioralism was primarily the fulfillment of the yearning within the discipline for a legitimate scientific status,
and the pure science of politics that behavioralism fostered was perceived by those involved to provide that legitimacy. The
implication of this scientific legitimation for normativity was the systematic exclusion of normative inquiry from the legitimated
pursuits of the discipline.
The study
of politics started to become a professional pursuit, sanctioned by a professional association. This trend toward professionalism
in the field of political research became more clear during the behavioral revolution's move to "pure" science. With behavioralism,
the discipline settled on a scientific identity, an identity that has changed little since its inception.
Behavioralism,
though, has its roots in the "science of politics movement" which began in the 1920s.
Political
scientists believed that a scientific, disciplinary and professional identity (i.e., acceptance as "legitimate" producers
of knowledge) depended on a common and useful methodology to separate trained "political scientists" from the methodologically
untrained amateurs . Experts in political studies would then use the correct methods of research to engage "in a communal
endeavor deserving recognition and respect for its original and valuable contributions to American society" (emphasis added).
Scientific method would allow political scientists to arrive at objective, value-free truth (or truths) about a certain aspect
of (usually) American politics in order to aid a modernizing polity in a purely technical way. There could be no normative
goals in a value-free science.
Political
scientists operated on the presupposition that humankind was perfectible and thus that a reliance on "scientific" political
knowledge would help to cure societal and political ills permanently (Merriam 1934: 184). The "scientific" political scientist
constructed political knowledge that could be applied in a technical way to governmental functions.
Merriam,
Charles E. 1934. Civic Education in the United States. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons:
In his scholarly
work Merriam consistently demanded that political science become more rigorously scientific, but with an applied as opposed
to a pure approach. He saw the development of a scientific technique and methodology for political science as a necessity
to avoid "speculation and guesswork" (quoted in Crick 1959: 138). Merriam viewed the physical sciences as attempts to benefit,
preserve and perfect civilization, and he reserved a place for political science in this process. He consciously sought to
control the "evolution of intelligence" and human behavior, through civic education, to instill democratic values in citizens
in the move towards the perfection of society and humankind (Crick 1959: 136-143).
Merriam
was always very vague about the nature of such control and about the implementation and ramifications of such a science in
his own work. Even so, Merriam was extraordinarily influential as he broke the ground for later political, scientific excavation.
He also helped to propel political science from obscurity into tentative legitimacy, at least in terms of federal funding
and acceptance (which is what the discipline had sought after for years). This legitimacy was enhanced by the behavioral revolution
of the 1950s.
Harold
Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics
Merriam’s
student, Harold Lasswell, held a primary interest in political behavior and its control through "conceptual frameworks" of
institutional and societal power (Crick 1959: 177). He was among the first of Merriam's students to argue that society consisted
of irrational voters and leaders whose behavior must be scientifically studied in order to make it rational (i.e., to control
it). Obviously, Lasswell strode a fine conceptual line between democratic and coercive politics. In fact, he often appears
to have tumbled over to the coercive side. His belief in popular irrationality immediately called into question the possibility
of "popular rule" that democracy purports to require. This clash between the scientific pursuit of human/societal perfection
and democratic values illuminated a methodological contradiction that the discipline feared might subvert its commitment to
democracy (Ricci 1984: 94-96).
In Psychopathology
and Politics, Lasswell makes an argument, based on certain aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis, that politics needs to be studied
with an emphasis on psychology and its relation to the personal and political behavior of individuals. Lasswell was not as
vehemently opposed to formalism as Merriam was, but he did argue that institutional analysts frequently overlook "the 'personal'
influences which modify the expected behavior of 'legislatures,' 'executives,' and 'judiciaries’" (Lasswell 1977: 2).
According
to Lasswell, politics was the realm of the irrational (184). The irrational displacement of affects was brought into the open
in the arena of politics. As such, political solutions are frequently not the best rational decisions, but the best emotional
ones (185). And irrelevancy accumulates in political symbols due to their emotional appeal (193; Lasswell 1938; Lasswell 1950:
38-51, 64-75). Consequently, Lasswell sees little use in democratic discussion as a means of dealing with political problems.
If the individual is shown to be a poor judge of his needs and interests, how effective can discussion be in resolving issues
of conflict? In response, Lasswell does not condone the resolution of conflicts. Rather, he sanctions their prevention.
Lasswell
argued that certain "objective investigators," schooled in the fields of psychology, psychopathology, physiology, medicine
and social science, will be able to "deal objectively" with themselves and with others in order to discover the "truth" of
harmonious human relations and thereby to obviate political conflicts (Lasswell 1977: 193, 196-197, 200-203). The interdisciplinary
political scientist, then, will be able to discern the cultural patterns of individual/social conflict and function as therapist
to prepare people to manage their emotional conflict "objectively" and thus make them and society more rational and purposive.
Lasswell envisions a utopia, one where radical political action is not necessary or desired. Rather, the education and research
of rational social scientists is offered as the cure for the irrational bases of society. In this way, a utopian society will
emerge and flourish (Crick 1959: 199).
Lasswell,
like Merriam, had noble and admirable goals in his pre-World War II work. He was also a talented and innovative social theorist.
Moreover, it is difficult to argue with his or with Merriam's desire to find the perfect society, free from conflict and irrationality.
Merriam and Lasswell simply wanted to install a professional identity for political scientists based on a science that was
organized to aid the liberal democratic state. As such, political knowledge was to be organized for the same purpose. And
this is part of the reason why such a formulation of science caught on in the discipline. It was constructed to correspond
to the technical needs of society and therefore it became the accepted (funded and legitimated) identity for political scientists
(Luke 1978: 3-4). But after World War II, this identity began to crumble. Behavioralists wanted to purify scientific political
knowledge.
Numerous
factors emerged to help establish behavioralism as a force in political science: political scientists perceived that they
were not considered legitimate scientists and consequently had problems securing research grants; they believed that the other
social sciences (particularly psychology) were making broad advances while political science lagged behind; the reformist,
normative nature of the discipline was generally considered speculative and unscientific; research technology (survey techniques,
statistical computations, computers) became much more refined and available; and they pursued a "pure" science which operated
on the presupposition that democracy is the best system of government due to its open and scientific qualities (Somit and
Tanenhaus 1968: 184-185). In short, post-World War II political scientists sought to define the science of politics from the
standpoint that science should be pure. The science of politics should be interested only in explaining the workings of American
democracy in order to understand the (American) system better.
Many post-war
political scientists wanted to embark on the pure scientific project of analyzing the workings of the American system without
tainting the analysis with speculative notions of reform. Here we see the first self-conscious attempts to push normative
political theory to the margins of the discipline. The assumption that American democracy is the best political system in
the world expels the normative determination of value from the discipline’s activities. A pure science, after all, cannot
consider such a claim. Rather, it must presuppose its end as it determines how best to reach or enhance it.
Although
it did ultimately become a driving force in political science, behavioralism did not begin as a coherent movement in the discipline.
Rather, post-World War II political scientists began rejecting formalist, reformist, normative inquiry and relying more upon
explaining the workings of the American political system.This phenomenon is exemplified by David Truman's revival of Arthur
Bentley's The Process of Government.
Behavioralists
like Heinz Eulau and David Easton furthered what ultimately became a movement by explicitly championing behavioral research.
Still though, behavioralism assumed many faces. It was a broad enough phenomenon to allow several different pursuits.
The Governmental
Process was Truman's most influential and noteworthy work. His commitment to a "pure" science of political behavior that sought
to examine and explain the uniformities and regularities of politics helped touch off the broad emphasis on political behavior
that distinguished the post-World War II research of political science. In his theories we can see expressions of four of
the first five tenets of the "behavioral creed." The emphasis on quantified, value-free and methodologically sound research
became clear later. Another behavioralist, Heinz Eulau, openly criticized the reformist ("utopian") political science of the
pre-World War II era (Eulau 1969a: 372). He argued that science can only function "in an environment that permits freedom
of inquiry and freedom of speech."
------------------------------------
Eulau,
Heinz. 1963. The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics. New York: Random House:
From Eulau's
view, the traditional separation between the "micro" and "macro" levels of political analysis represented a problem that needed
resolution. Macro level analysis aimed at institutions, while micro analysis focused on individuals. Typically, these two
approaches operated dualistically; they were kept separate because political theorists had not built a conceptual link between
them. But Lasswell, in Psychopathology and Politics, attempted to combine the micro and macro levels of analysis to explain
political action. Eulau saw this conceptual connection as vital to the science of politics (Eulau 1969d: 122-137). He argued
that these two levels of analysis can be merged through studying political behavior. The study of political behavior focuses
on individuals' attitudes, actions and psyches and on the political institutions which frame, affect and are affected by individuals'
personal and political dispositions. Eulau located the science of politics in the study of political behavior that collapsed
micro and macro level distinctions. Such a science would ideally be empirical and focused on finding uniformities and regularities
in political behavior. The careful documentation of regular and uniform behavior would help explain and eventually predict
institutional influences on behavior, and vice versa (Eulau 1969c: 358; 1969b: 15; 1964: 33, 44, 64). Empirical methods which
were theory-driven (that is, based upon testable hypotheses) give knowledge; they strip ignorance from belief and produce
political knowledge (Eulau 1969a: 390; 1969b: 8-9, 15-17; 1963: 9, 26, 34, 69).
Political
knowledge, according to Eulau, is necessarily "probabilistic." That is, political scientists are certain that their knowledge
is probably correct. But they seek to be certain that their knowledge is definitely correct. They seek certainty, "universal
validity," for political knowledge. Eulau claims that this quest for certainty is implicit in empirical, behavioral methods.
But, for now, political scientists must settle for probability until political knowledge progresses enough to allow for universal
validity (Eulau 1969e: 366-367; 1969a: 15-16, 19; 1963: 10, 35).
Accompanying
the quest for certainty and the self-conscious employment of methodology is the separation of fact from value. In other words,
political scientists must eschew values in their detached, scientific work. As such, political scientists seek "neutrality"
toward their research. This neutrality can be guaranteed through the researcher's openness about his biases and by treating
"latent" biases as "errors" which can be "isolated and discounted" (Eulau 1969e: 366-369; 1963: 95, 137).
Confessed
and discounted biases contribute to the quest for certainty and so does quantification. According to Eulau, political scientists
should seek to quantify their data and their results. Quantification, using the most advanced research technology, empirical
methods and testable hypotheses, introduces exactitude and reliability to political knowledge (Eulau 1969c: 361-362; 1963:
122). Eulau argued that quantification allows political scientists to be more certain about the legitimacy of political knowledge.
"Political knowledge," realized through behavioral methods, emphasizes reason. It represents the belief that employing rational,
rigorous methods of inquiry can help us discover the underlying, uniform and cosmic order of political things. For Eulau,
political knowledge represents truth in a probabilistic sense, but its quest for certainty makes it valid and authoritative.
This formulation of knowledge left little room for normative political theory. In fact, in many ways normative political theory
was consciously excluded from the normal practice of political scientists (Gunnell 1993: 223-225), and the postbehavioral
era under which the discipline now operates has not necessarily altered this situation.
============================================
============================================
Postbehavioralism sought relevance, action, and openness
in the discipline, but there certainly was no postbehavioral method to be followed nor was there any organized postbehavioral
identity. [It, however, is useful as a critique of behaviouralism].
Aside from
some oblique references to it (Easton 1969; Graham and Carey 1972), we cannot say with any certainty that any distinct movement
known as postbehavioralism has ever existed in the discipline. Rather, postbehavioralism can only be said to exist insofar
as the behavioral era has been followed by an era in which political scientists undertake research in a markedly different
way and a slightly altered methodology has accompanied this new approach.
It has been
during the postbehavioral era that "postpositivism" has taken hold in the discipline of political science. The opening of
the discipline to new approaches to studying politics also extended the discipline’s tolerance to some of the emerging
critiques of social scientific practice. The main attack on positivist doctrine originated with Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions (1970 [1962]).
Kuhn argues
that science does not progress by the piecemeal accumulation of knowledge. Instead, scientific development and change occurs
through revolution (1970: 111-173). Kuhn postulates three phases in the development of a science. The first is "pre-paradigmatic"
in which various "schools" compete to attain the status of "paradigm." A paradigm is a particular world-view. It provides
a model from which "particular coherent traditions of scientific research" spring (1970: 10). Ptolemaic astronomy, for example,
was a paradigm and it operated from the perspective that the earth was the center of the universe. The Ptolemaic paradigm
was replaced via scientific revolution by the Copernican system which contended that the earth and the planets revolve around
the sun. Revolution is the second phase of scientific development. The third phase is the paradigmatic phase. Kuhn calls this
"normal science," indicating that a given science has matured, that it has progressed from its pre-paradigmatic immaturity
(1970: 11). This perspective clearly undermined the positivist notion of scientific development portrayed by Heinz Eulau who
claimed that the "discipline is built by the slow, modest, and piecemeal accumulation of relevant theories and data" (1963:
9). The "building-block" theory of the behavioralists certainly was subject to Kuhn’s critique, but so was the idea
of a social science itself, since Kuhn indicated that social science does not yet appear to have developed any paradigms at
all (1970: 15). Political science, then, must be an immature science (or prescientific) by Kuhn’s account.
Kuhn’s
oblique dismissal of the social sciences from his account of "normal science" touched off furious attempts by political scientists
to locate paradigms within the discipline. Otherwise it might once again be subject to the arguments (which certainly exist
to this day) that political science cannot be thought of as a science in any "real" sense, arguments which might scare away
sources of funding by undermining the discipline’s legitimacy as "science." The field of international relations seems
to have been particularly affected by this possibility insofar as it has been characterized by its desperate (and apparently
fruitless) search for a paradigm (Ferguson and Mansbach 1993: 14-31; Rosenau 1971; Ashley 1977: 150). But political scientists
of all stripes jumped on the Kuhnian bandwagon of science for fear of being left behind among the rabble of non-scientists.
In so doing, the discipline informally oriented itself around a new "postpositivist" or "postempiricist" science.
==========================================
Notes &
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Bentley,
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__________.
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__________.
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__________.
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__________.
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